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In secular societies, the principle of rule of law implies that 
churches and other social institutions may not assert themselves as 
above the law or replace the official law1 with their moral or canon 
rules. Abiding by this principle is a problem not only for the 
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC or the Church), but also for many 
other religious denominations that historically have carried 
considerable sway over social and political life in their countries by 
way of their “moral entrepreneurship”2 and that are now reluctant 
to cede that influence. Surely, different denominations tackle the 
principle of rule of law in different ways, and the extent of their 
resistance and collaboration with this principle varies broadly—
from theocratic regimes with high levels of resistance to the official 
 
 Mikhail Antonov is a Professor of Law associated with the Law Faculty at the 
National Research University, Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg). 
 1. Distinguished from canon law, customary law, soft law, and other varieties of 
“living law” would be embraced by a broad understanding of law as a form of normative or 
social ordering. See, e.g., Mikhail Antonov, In the Quest of Global Legal Pluralism, in 
POSITIVITÄT, NORMATIVITÄT UND INSTITUTIONALITÄT DES RECHTS 15–30 (Aulis Aarnio et al. 
eds., 2013). 
 2. This kind of moral authority analyzed by Professor Stoeckl means that the Church 
takes part in constructing cognitive frames of Russian society in order to guide public 
perceptions of appropriateness, sometimes contrary to the letter of law. Kristina Stoeckl, The 
Russian Orthodox Church as Moral Norm Entrepreneur, 44 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 132 (2016). 
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law to liberal regimes in which churches tend to collaborate rather 
than resist. Not surprisingly, each case often corresponds with the 
legal culture and history within each respective country. 
This is the case in Russia, where the principle of rule of law and 
the provision regarding the separation of church and state in the 
1993 Constitution are placed into a larger intellectual framework in 
which the Church has reinforced the legitimacy of the State and its 
legal prescriptions. Certain developments in post-Soviet Russia 
suggest that the Church’s ambitions go far beyond the status quo 
that existed before the 1917 Revolution. The restoration of the 
Patriarchate in 1918, along with important privileges that the ROC 
snatched from the weak Russian State in the early 1990s, stir the 
Church’s ambitions toward more aspirational goals. These 
ambitions are informed by narratives glorifying traditions of 
cooperation of church and state in Russian medieval history and 
the ideology that underpinned this cooperation. In turn, this 
ideology goes back to Byzantine social philosophies where church-
state cooperation was described in terms of Symphonia. 
Theoretically, almost no type of church-state relations, beyond 
radical atheistic and theocratic regimes, a priori violate the rule of 
law. In this sense, French laicité, American wall of separation, as well 
as cooperationist models are generally compatible with the rule of 
law. However, church-state cooperation in contemporary Russia 
often provokes concerns and criticism as being incompatible with 
the principles of rule of law and of secularity which are enshrined 
in Articles 1 and 14 of the Russian Constitution.3 While the model 
of church-state relations in the Russian Constitution is literally 
separationist (it has both free exercise and establishment clauses), 
constitutional practices, ordinary laws, and administrative 
practices are grounded on an absolutely different logic of favoring 
the ROC and disfavoring non-traditional religious denominations.4 
The present Article will outline the legal, ideological, and ethical 
background of this contradiction, focusing on the prevailing 
 
 3. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.) The 
official English version is available at Russia’s Supreme Court website, 
http://www.supcourt.ru/en/documents/constitution/, with amendments through July 
21, 2014. Unless indicated otherwise, references to “Article” or “Chapter” in this Article shall 
mean articles and chapters of the Russian Constitution. 
 4. See generally Mikhail Antonov & Ekaterina Samokhina, The Realist and Rhetorical 
Dimensions of the Protection of Religious Feelings in Russia, 40 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 229 (2015). 
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ideological pattern of church-state cooperation described with 
reference to the Byzantine concept of Symphonia. 
As will be shown below, this concept is still utilized by the ROC 
to embrace an ideal model of church-state relations that largely 
differs from the original Byzantine version and from its 
conceptualizations in medieval Russia. Is this model in its Russian 
version—in the manner reflected in the ROC’s main policy 
documents—compatible with the principle of rule of law 
(Rechtsstaat)5 enshrined in Article 1 of the Russian Constitution? 
This problem will be analyzed by examining the example of the 
Church’s attitude toward human rights and, more specifically, how 
the Church manipulates religious teaching on human dignity to 
reinterpret the liberal conception of human rights enshrined in the 
Russian Constitution. My working hypothesis is that the Church’s 
attitude is intertwined with the ROC’s larger strategy to assume the 
lead in ideological spheres; this strategy itself problematizes the 
principle of secularity and separation of state and church. So far, 
the State has not actively resisted this strategy of the Church, 
putatively seeing the Church only as an efficient tool for fostering 
the government’s legitimacy and without considering the Church 
as a serious competitor in political and ideological matters.6 
The Church’s attitude toward the separation principle is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the ROC endorses it to protect its own 
competences and interests from the State’s interferences, appealing 
to human rights and the separation principle when the State’s 
intrusions are perceived as exorbitant. On the other hand, the 
Church claims that state and church shall be one, like body and soul 
(the body language that underpins the concept of Symphonia), so 
that the Church may, in the legal field, prioritize religious morals 
over legal norms and principles and define limits for the 
interpretation and application of human rights. This normative 
conflict becomes clear when the Church imposes its moral 
conception of human dignity on the liberal reading of human 
 
 5. The Russian term pravovoe gosudarstvo utilized in the Constitution is the literal 
translation of Rechtsstaat, but in legal scholarship this Russian term covers both Rechtsstaat 
and rule of law. 
 6. Such an attitude seems to reflect the real political situation in which the ROC has 
little chance to really assert its will and to impose it on the State. Nonetheless, this does not 
impede aspirational thinkers from creating ambitious, albeit unrealistic schemes of 
restoration of Symphonia. These schemes are enshrined in a number of normative documents 
of the Church and are repeatedly utilized by its top hierarchs, which confirms their symbolic 
power and ideological attractivity. 
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rights.7 In another dimension, this conflict means that the ROC 
thereby challenges not only the principle of secularity, but also calls 
into question the principle of rule of law. 
One may be surprised: Why discuss this latter principle in 
Russia—a country that is heavily criticized for the lack of the rule 
of law in many spheres? The present Article does not intend to 
analyze whether this criticism is justified or not. Regardless, the 
rule of law is often not black and white, so that one might miss the 
point of arguing that some countries have this principle 
incorporated into their law and politics and some have not. For so-
called transitory countries (on the way from socialist popular 
democracies toward western liberal democracies), this principle 
can be seen rather as a polychromic continuum—Russia, Poland, 
Hungary, and other post-socialist countries have established the 
rule of law de jure as a constitutional principle, but de facto have yet 
to succeed in fully implementing it.8 
This Article does not have the ambition to evaluate Russia’s 
success or failure in moving along this transformational path. My 
use of the term “rule of law” here means only that de jure, Russia 
has the rule of law in a sense as the rule of written laws or rule by 
law, which means that secular laws govern every other social norm, 
including religious ones.9 This is confirmed by the above-
mentioned constitutional provisions and by the fact that state law 
evidently prevails over other normative orders of “living law” in 
Russia. De facto, although Russia does not soar in rule-of-law 
rankings, at least, it is not the last country on the list, which 
suggests that there is at least “some” rule of law in Russia. 
Part I addresses the long-term strategy of the Church to 
cooperate with the State so that this latter protects the Church, 
while the Church legitimizes the State’s policies insofar as these fit 
the Church’s objectives.  
This strategy could efficiently work in Imperial Russia where 
the Orthodoxy was an official religion and, since the eighteenth 
 
 7. See generally KRISTINA STOECKL, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND  
HUMAN RIGHTS (2014). 
 8. Among others, the conception of the rule of law as a continuum, not a black and 
white dichotomy, is developed by Professor Gowder. See PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW 
IN THE REAL WORLD (2016). 
 9. Discretional disrespect of law and its misuses in “high-profile cases” is another 
conceptual aspect that goes beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, 
Assessing the Rule of Law in Russia, in DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN POLITICS 9, 108–18 (Richard 
Sakwa et al. eds., 2019). 
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century, the emperor was also the head of the Church. When the 
Church attempted to regain its power in post-Soviet Russia, it 
followed this pre-revolutionary pattern of church-state 
cooperation. But, as Part II argues, this strategy was no longer 
compatible with the principles enshrined in the 1993 Constitution.  
The Church had to tackle this discrepancy and, as a result, the 
Church’s Social Concept appeared in 2000. Part III examines the 
attempted combination of theological and constitutional principles 
in that document. The conception of Symphonia proposed by the 
Concept did not fit either the Russian Constitution or the Orthodox 
teaching on church-state cooperation.  
Despite this principal incompatibility, the conception of 
Symphonia became widely applied not only by the Church’s 
hierarchs but also by Russian political leaders. In fact, Symphonia as 
interpreted in the Social Concept turned into one of ideological 
tools of the Russian State. This transformation is briefly studied in 
Part IV, where the 2020 constitutional amendments are cited as one 
of the typical patterns of this cooperation.  
This tandem work of the State and the Church was not 
cloudless—gradually certain tensions became perceptible. At some 
points the Church, inspired by too-ambitious interpretations of 
Symphonia, tried to impose onto the State solutions which were 
overtly incompatible with the constitutional law. These tensions are 
examined in Part V.  
It turns out that on such sensitive issues as that of human rights, 
the State is not ready to fully replace its legal rules by the Church’s 
religious ethics, although interpretation of these rules rarely goes 
in line with conservative doctrines of the Church. This situation is 
summed up in the Conclusion.  
I. THE CHURCH’S ASPIRATIONS TO WORK IN  
TANDEM WITH THE STATE 
According to the Preamble of the 1997 Russian Law On Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Associations, Russian Orthodoxy holds a 
“special role in the history of Russia and in the establishment and 
development of Russia’s spirituality and culture.”10 Along with this 
 
 10. Federal’nyĭ Zakon RF o Svobode Sovesti i o Religioznykh Ob”edinenii͡akh [Federal 
Law of the Russian Federation on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations] 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII, [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
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symbolic recognition, the Church received a number of material 
privileges, from duty-free tobacco imports to the return of 
properties nationalized by the Bolsheviks. In return, the ROC 
works to maintain the legitimacy of state power and, for this 
purpose, appropriates that power to define the ultimate goals of 
social development in Russia. This de facto situation resulted from 
the ideological vacuum of the early 1990s and the general weakness 
of the State at that time. This situation enabled the Church’s 
aspirations. Under Putin’s rule, the Russian State actively started to 
reestablish its symbolic power and to demonstrate its own 
ideological ambition. This immediately prompted the ROC to craft 
several documents in which it attempted to restate its ideological 
authority, relying on centuries-old Russian and Orthodox tradition. 
Illustratively, in recent years the Church has supported the 
State not only by legitimizing its power inside Russia, but also by 
endorsing controversial Russian campaigns abroad, like the Syrian 
war or the conflict with Ukraine.11 The ROC was also able to creep 
into decision-making processes at different levels of political power 
and to make its voice be heard with respect to some principal legal 
matters, including anti-gay and domestic violence legislation.12 The 
2020 constitutional amendments,13 in which the Church 
successfully lobbied for the heterosexual marriage clause,14 the 
state-forming people clause,15 and the mentions of traditional 
values and God in the Constitution, can be considered as one of its 
 
Collection of Legislation] 1997, No. 125. The official Russian version is available at 
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102049359. 
 11. See, e.g., Dmitry Adamsky, The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow’s 
Syrian Campaign, PONARS EURASIA (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.ponarseurasia.org/ 
memo/role-russian-orthodox-church-moscows-syrian-campaign; Mikhail Suslov, 
The Russian Orthodox Church and the Crisis in Ukraine, in CHURCHES IN THE UKRAINIAN 
CRISIS 133–62 (Andrii Krawchuk & Thomas Bremer eds., 2016). 
 12. See, e.g., Jamie Manson, The Orthodox Church’s Role in Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws, NAT’L 
CATH. REP. (Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/grace-margins/orthodox-
church-s-role-russia-s-anti-gay-laws; Russian Orthodox Leader Rails Against ‘Foreign’ Domestic 
Violence Law, MOSCOW TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/01/ 
07/russian-orthodox-leader-rails-against-foreign-domestic-violence-law-a68829. 
 13. Federal’nyĭ Zakon RF o Popravke k Konstitut͡sii Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡siĭ [Federal Law 
of the Russian Federation on Amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation] 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII, [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2020, No. 1. The official Russian version is available at 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202003140001. 
 14. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.) art. 72, 
para. 1, pt. zh.-1 (adopted 2020). 
 15. Id. art. 68, para. 1. 
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latest significant ideological victories.16 However, apart from 
bargaining for ad hoc privileges, there was no realistic long-term 
strategy in the ROC’s relations with the Russian State—the 
Church’s ideological and other ambitions had aspirational 
character informed by rather old conceptual schemes with little to 
do with actual Russian constitutional law. It comes therefore as no 
wonder that the Church sometimes was unsuccessful in its 
attempts to impose a number of legislative restrictions, such as the 
ban on abortion.17 
The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (the 
Social Concept), adopted at the Sacred Bishops’ Council of the ROC 
on August 14, 2000,18 was the first consistent attempt to outline a 
strategy of the Church in its interaction with the State. This strategy 
exposed the medieval conception of Symphonia, which hardly fits 
the Russian Constitution. The Social Concept’s authors utilized 
Symphonia to outline the ROC’s ideal pattern in terms of the 
relationship between “body” (state) and “soul” (church): “[I]t is in 
their linkage and harmony that the well-being of a state lies.”19 
References to the past usually reinforce modern-day ideological 
messages (not infrequently without accounting for differences 
between past and present situations) by comparing them with 
seemingly persuasive examples that stir national pride and the 
ideology of the greatness of state power (velikoderzhavnost’, in 
Russian conservative parlance). From this standpoint, it is not 
surprising that the Church decided to justify its cooperation with 
the State and the equal status within this cooperation by allusions 
 
 16. Kristina Stoeckl justly opined that “[t]he Church officials were, in short, successful 
in having their priorities reflected in the Russian constitution of 2020.” Kristina Stoeckl, The 
End of Post-Soviet Religion: Russian Orthodoxy as a National Church, PUB. ORTHODOXY (July 20, 
2020), https://publicorthodoxy.org/2020/07/20/the-end-of-post-soviet-religion/. 
 17. All that the ROC could gain in its long and still ongoing struggle against abortions 
in Russia was a declaratory agreement on cooperation with the R.F. Ministry of Public Health 
regarding healthcare. Article 9 of this agreement (signed on June 18, 2015) describes how the 
Ministry and the Church will coordinate their efforts in matters pertaining to pregnancy and 
childbirth. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, SOGLASHENIE O SOTRUDNICHESTVE MEZHDU 
MINISTERSTVOM ZDRAVOOKHRANENII͡A ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERAT͡SII I RUSSKOĬ PRAVOSLAVNOĬ 
T͡SERKOVʹI͡U (2015), http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4124569.html. This declaratory 
document is characteristic for the general framework of Symphonia between the Church and 
the state authorities. Id. 
 18. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE BASIS OF THE SOCIAL CONCEPT  
(2000), http://orthodoxrights.org/documents/the-basis-of-the-social-concept [hereinafter 
SOCIAL CONCEPT]. 
 19. Id. § III.4. Below, paragraphs (para.) will refer to the Social Concept’s sections or, if 
specially mentioned, to sections of the Basic Teaching on Dignity. 
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to centuries-old patterns stemming from the “glorious past” of 
Russia and of Byzantium (portrayed as the spiritual predecessor of 
Orthodox Russia, the “second Rome”). This conceptual reference is 
quite ambiguous and theoretically risks creating conflicts between 
the ROC and the Russian State. The apparent problem is that within 
the framework of “symphonic” cooperation, the Church uses its 
power to influence the State’s legislative and judicial decisions, 
which is unacceptable in a rule-of-law state.20 
The kind of Symphonia formulated in the Social Concept suggests 
that the Church appropriates its power to define what the social, 
spiritual, and other goals of the society shall be, and leaves to the 
State only to decide how to reach these goals, implicitly preserving 
a kind of “veto power.” The Church shall retain the right to 
evaluate state policies and norms,21 and given that “God’s 
commandment to fulfil the task of salvation in any situation and 
under any circumstances is above this loyalty,” the Church may 
“refuse to obey the State.”22 Body politics in the Social Concept, 
analogies with consubstantiality, and other mystical allegories did 
not contribute to a sensible delineation of mutual requirements and 
competences of the Russian State and the Church. Their relations 
gradually turned into an implicit de facto alliance, with no clear 
rules of the game either for the Church or the State. The difficulty 
with playing Symphonia between the Russian State and the ROC is 
that the Church’s claims do not fit with either the real political 
situation or current Russian law. Informed by the Slavophile 
ideology,23 neither party pays enough attention to the differences 
between the legal frameworks of Byzantium and medieval Russia, 
and current Russian constitutional law. 
One oft-cited example from early Russian history can illustrate 
this symphonic approach. When Prince Vladimir the Great in AD 
 
 20. In Russia, churches are not legally precluded from lobbying for political decisions, 
so the ROC’s insistence on making its voice heard does not contradict as such the rule of  
law principle. Also, in liberal democracies, religious beliefs of policymakers can play a 
significant role. However, the expressions utilized by the authors of the Social Concept  
and their tonality demonstrate that the Church’s ambitions go far beyond a simple 
participation in public deliberations. As will be shown below, the ROC claims, along with 
the power to give binding advice to state authorities, a kind of veto right for state policies 
and judicial and legislative decisions. 
 21. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.4. 
 22. Id. § III.5 (emphasis omitted). 
 23. Mikhail Suslov, Genealogiia monarkhicheskoi idei v postsovetskikh politicheskikh 
diskursakh Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 3 GOSUDARSTVO, RELIGIIIA, TSERKOV’ V ROSSII I ZA 
RUBEZHOM 75–116 (2014). 
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996 decided, shortly after the Baptism of 988, to abolish capital 
punishment, clerics persuaded the Prince that he had been divinely 
appointed to reward the just and to punish the wrongdoers.24 
Ceding to this persuasion, Vladimir mandated,  
Whoever violates these rules, which we have established in 
accordance with the canons of the Church Fathers and 
according to the regulations of the first emperors, whoever 
shall violate these rules, whether my children, my great-
grandchildren, or a lieutenant in some town, or an overseer, 
or judge, and they offend a church court, or someone else, 
then may they be cursed in this age and in the next by the 
seven ecumenical councils of the holy Fathers.25  
This way, the Prince linked his political authority and binding force 
of his enactments with the rules of the Church. 
When the Social Concept mentions that medieval Russian 
church-state relations were the best example of Symphonia,26 its 
authors apparently have in mind something similar to such a veto 
power. From the Social Concept’s perspective, the ideal framework 
of church-state relations is when the Church does not meddle in  
the routine work of the state machine but from time to time 
interferes to correct grave errors that are potentially dangerous for 
the entire society. 
Albeit historically placed under the tutelage of the State during 
the Synodal period (1721–1917), the Church formally enjoyed the 
symbolic power to define religious dogma and to influence state 
policies and rules related, even indirectly, to dogma. The Church 
justified its power by the fact that the emperor was at the same time 
the supreme legal authority and the head of the Church after 1721: 
solely to him belonged both the privilege to issue legal norms 
(acting as the emperor) and to legitimize them (acting as the head 
of the Church). This system distorted the pattern of Symphonia as 
two authorities coincided in one person. In 1918, the Patriarchate 
was restored, and in the late 1980s the ROC returned to  
 
 24. Ferdinand M. Feldbrugge, Wergeld, Bloodwite, and the Emergence of Criminal Law, in 
VON KONTINUITÄTEN UND BRÜCHEN: OSTRECHT IM WANDEL DER ZEITEN 3, 3 (Herbert  
Küpper ed. 2011). 
 25. THE LAWS OF RUS’: TENTH TO FIFTEENTH CENTURIES 44 (Daniel H. Kaiser ed. and 
trans., 1992) (alterations omitted). 
  26. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.4 (“Unlike Byzantine basileuses, Russian tsars 
had a different legacy. For this and other historical reasons, relationship between the church 
and the state authorities was more harmonious in Russian antiquity.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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the pre-Petrine27 conceptualization of church-state relations, 
representing this return as fidelity to the centuries-old tradition of 
the Orthodox Symphonia. 
Apparently, this basic presupposition has not changed over the 
years; in its “conservative crusade”28 the ROC still relies on a 
symphonic “concordat” with the State, considering Symphonia as 
binding both on the State and the Church—as this dogma stems 
from national tradition and spirituality. As the religious power to 
formulate and to interpret this dogma belongs to the Church, the 
Church turns out to be the only agency with the final say about the 
validity of relevant legal enactments and whether they conform 
with religious ethics or not. It is this theocratic supposition that is 
implied in the Teaching’s statement about the supremacy of “the 
divine truth, the eternal moral law given by the Lord . . . no matter 
whether the will of particular people or people’s communities 
agree with it or not.”29  Surely, states might ignore such ecclesiastic 
judgments, and this happens very often in secular societies. The 
Russian specificity is that the State made itself more vulnerable by 
basing (in part) its legitimacy on national religious tradition and 
therefore making its legitimacy dependent on continuing to play 
the Symphonia with the Church. 
II. THE POWER OF TRADITION AGAINST  
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES? 
One imminent danger against which the ROC’s hierarchs 
constantly plead is the liberal ideology of human rights that is 
allegedly based on individualism and therefore is irreconcilable 
with Russian national identity. This “liberal individualism” in the 
1993 Constitution is completely ignored by the Social Concept. 
Moreover, this policy document does not even mention the 
Constitution. The ROC makes it explicit that it “cannot favour a 
world order that puts in the centre of everything the human 
 
 27. Predating Peter the Great, tsar of Russia from 1682 to his death in 1725. 
 28. Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church’s Conservative Crusade, 116 CURRENT 
HIST. 271 (2017). 
  29. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH’S BASIC 
TEACHING ON HUMAN DIGNITY, FREEDOM AND RIGHTS § III.2 (2008), 
https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights [hereinafter TEACHING]. While 
this Article was being written, the Church removed the official English translation from its 
website for unknown reasons. The English text is also available at 
http://orthodoxrights.org/documents/russian-church-freedom-and-rights. 
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personality darkened by sin”30 and stirs nationalist sentiments to 
counter liberal individualism all over the world.31 
This vision suggests that religion must prioritize collective 
interest over individual choice. Given that the liberal interpretation 
of the rule of law puts human value, as it is and irrespective of how 
it is evaluated in terms of religious morals, at the foundation of 
democratic legal order, religious criticism of liberal individualism 
may sound like a challenge to the rule of law. Nonetheless, the 
Social Concept implicitly disavows the right of each individual to 
make his or her own ethical choice and develop his or her 
personality without comparison to “correct” religious ethics. One 
contemporary Russian researcher noticed that “the ROC has never 
lived in a pluralistic society and such a situation is contrary to the 
Church’s historical, spiritual and cultural experience. This 
experience cannot consider pluralism as normative, as positive, as 
a good dimension of human life.”32 
Today, the degree of the conservative Symphonia is so intense 
that it is not clear who plays the “first fiddle” in the exceptionalist 
narrative that now prevails in Russia: the Church or the State.33 The 
former inspired the illiberal narrative in the early 1990s. It is around 
the agenda of desecularization defended by the ROC that sundry 
conservative forces closed their ranks, while the first Russian 
President, Boris Yeltsin, formally paid lip service to the agenda of 
westernization and liberalization, shying from the Church’s 
identitarian agenda.34 Consequential development of this agenda 
involved the denial of human rights as an independent imperative 
that binds religious morals. To restrict the human rights granted by 
 
 30. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § XVI.4. 
 31. It is symptomatic that the amendment to the R.F. Constitution about Russians as 
the state-forming people came from within ROC circles, from the Orthodox archpriest 
Dmitry Smirnov who is the head of the Patriarchal Commission for Family, Defense of 
Motherhood and Childhood. See RPT predlagaet otrazit’ v Konstitutsii osobuiu rol’ russkogo 
naroda, INTERFAX, (Feb. 9, 2020) http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=74235. 
However, this proclivity to nationalism is not inherent in Russian Orthodox political 
philosophy. See generally Anastasia Mitrofanova, L’Église orthodoxe russe: nationalisme ou 
universalité?, 3 HERODOTE 97 (2017) (Fr.). 
 32. ALEKSEI SITNIKOV, PRAVOSLAVIE, INSTITUTY VLASTI I GRAZHDANSKOGO 
OBSHCHESTVA 166 (2012). 
 33. See Fedor Stanzhevskiy & Dmitry Goncharko, Pluralism and Conflict: The Debate 
About “Russian Values” and Politics of Identity, 13 J. NATIONALISM, MEMORY & LANGUAGE POL. 
251 (2019). 
 34. Sergei Korolev, Sekuliarizatsiia i desekuliarizatsiia v kontekste kontseptsii 
psevdomorfnogo razvitiia Rossii, 1 FILOSOFSKAIA MYSL’ 1–54 (2015). 
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the Constitution through application of religious morals is already 
happening in Russian courts, which prefer to discard posited 
constitutional freedoms for the sake of “traditional values.” 
These traditional values work in Russian political discourse as 
a means to counteract Western liberal ideology. The role of the ROC 
in formulating and implementing traditional values can be seen 
differently. It does not appear as if the Church continued to follow 
the centuries-old pattern of submitting to be the State’s 
instrument—the ROC clearly pursues a more active and 
independent strategy in promoting its identitarian ideology 
through the Russian State.35 The Russian State’s traditional-values 
ideology was evidently informed by the religious conceptions 
advocated by the ROC—in this aspect, the State and the Church are 
likely to adhere to the pattern of Symphonia as coordination of their 
mutual efforts to preserve the national identity of Russians is 
allegedly based on Orthodoxy.36 
In 2000, the future Patriarch Kirill (then Metropolitan of 
Smolensk and Kaliningrad) set out this identarian ideology of 
traditional values in the following manner: 
If currently liberal thought is used as a basis for the country’s 
public and social development model, then, in full compliance 
with the liberal principle of checks and balances, it must be 
countered with a policy of introducing a system of values that are 
traditional for Russia into the upbringing of youth, education, and 
interpersonal relationship formation. Thus, the issue of shaping 
legislation, education, culture, social relations, and public morals 
is, in fact, a matter of preservation of our national civilization in 
the coming century. It is a matter of finding our place in the global 
community of nations and of survival as an Orthodox nation.37 
Later, in 2006, he saw the central idea of his conception of 
traditional values in “according human rights with traditional 
 
 35. See Kristina Stoeckl, Постсекулярные конфликты и глобальная борьба за 
традиционные ценности, 4 GOSUDARSTVO, RELIGIIA, TSERKOV’ V ROSSII I ZA RUBEZHOM  
223–41 (2016). 
 36. “Within the framework of the narrative of Russia as ‘the guardian of traditional 
values,’ the interests of the Kremlin and the ROC are complementary and their efforts 
parallel.” ALICJA CURANOVIĆ, THE GUARDIANS OF TRADITIONAL VALUES: RUSSIA AND THE 
RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE QUEST FOR STATUS 22 (2015). 
 37. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Norma very kak norma  
zhizni, NEZAVISIMAIA GAZETA (Feb. 16, 2000) (author’s translation), 
https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-02-16/8_norma.html. 
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morality.”38 Such references to religious morals in the matter of 
human rights provide a practicable (for the illiberal Russian 
government) defense of exceptionalism against universal human 
rights standards, as “according rights with morality” inevitably 
implies restricting these rights in a conservative sense. 
Assuming that Russian people have their own religious morals 
separate from the morals forecasted in other Orthodox peoples, let 
alone the morals of people of the decayed West, there is no good 
reason to subordinate State policies to universal human rights 
standards informed by “alien” morals.39 This is another convenient 
ideological argument persistently used by Russian political 
leaders.40 This is also the position of the Church implicitly exposed 
in another policy document: the Basic Teaching of the Russian 
Orthodox Church on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights (the 
Teaching), adopted on June 22, 2008.41 
In various matters—education, marriage, and other social 
fields—the ROC does not shy away from imposing on the State its 
views informed by religious morals. The ROC’s strategy for 
fighting abortion, same-sex marriage, and other practices seems to 
rely on the same theoretical background that prioritizes the 
Church’s opinion, including the power of ethical judgment about 
admissibility of human rights.42 At first sight, this approach follows 
the original meanings of Symphonia, providing the Church with 
symbolic ideological power. The problem is not that this power of 
judgment belongs to the Church, but the legal consequences, which 
are anticipated in the Social Concept and the Teaching. In case of a 
negative judgment, the relevant constitutional provision ceases to 
 
 38. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman, Dep’t for External 
Church Rels. of the Moscow Patriarchate, Presentation at the ‘Evolution of Moral  
Values and Human Rights in Multicultural Society’ Conference: The Experience of  
Viewing the Problems of Human Rights and their Moral Foundations in European  
Religious Communities (Oct. 30, 2006). 
 39. For a description of the growing nationalist moods in the ROC and their 
intellectual origins, see Zoe Knox, Russian Orthodoxy, Russian Nationalism and Patriarch Aleksii 
II, 4 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 533 (2005), and Daniela Kalkandjieva, Orthodoxy and Nationalism 
in Russian Orthodoxy, 3-4 ST. VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL Q. 281 (2013). 
 40. See ANASTASIA LIKHACHEVA, IGOR MAKAROV, PAVEL ANDREEV, ALEXANDER 
GABUEV & EKATERINA MAKAROVA, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA: 
VALADAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT (2014), http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/ 
Identity_eng.pdf. 
 41. TEACHING, supra note 29. 
 42. Alexander Agadjanian, Liberal Individual and Christian Culture: Russian Orthodox 
Teaching on Human Rights in Social Theory Perspective, 38 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 97 (2010). 
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be binding, so that believers have the right to disobey.43 The 
language of the Teaching allows for the conclusion that this religious 
right (and obligation at the same time) is not subject to constraints 
of constitutional and international law—this right is constructed as 
a religious duty and empowers believers to consider legal norms as 
having no binding force if those laws contravene religious ethics.44 
III. THE CHURCH AIMED AT BROADENING THE  
LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY? 
In accordance with the Social Concept, the ROC accepts the 
general principle of separation of state and church: they shall be 
distinguished by their competences, and cooperation must be 
 
 43. In 2000, the ROC openly authorized civil disobedience to state laws. 
If the Church and her holy authorities find it impossible to obey state laws and 
orders, after a due consideration of the problem, they may take the following 
action: enter into direct dialogue with authority on the problem, call upon the 
people to use the democratic mechanisms to change the legislation or review the 
authority’s decision, apply to international bodies and the world public opinion 
and appeal to her faithful for peaceful civil disobedience. 
SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.5. The 2008 Teaching also allows it, but in more careful 
words: 
Without seeking a revolutionary reconstruction of the world and acknowledging 
the rights of other social groups to participate in social transformations on the basis 
of their own worldview, the Orthodox Christians reserve the right to participate 
in building public life in a way that does not contradict their faith and 
moral principles. 
TEACHING, supra note 29, § V.4. One recent example of this disobedience was the incitement 
on the part of various ROC hierarchs to ignore COVID-related restrictions. See Mikhail 
Antonov, Russian Orthodox Symphonia in the Time of Coronavirus , INT’L CTR. FOR L. & 
RELIGION STUD. (July 24, 2020), https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2020/07/24/russian -
orthodox-symphonia-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/. 
 44. “While recognizing the value of freedom of choice, the Church affirms that this 
freedom will inevitably disappear if the choice is made in favor of evil.” TEACHING, 
supra note 29, § II.2. “The exercise of human rights should not be used to justify any 
encroachment on religious holy symbols things, cultural values and the identity of a nation.” 
Id. § III.5. It has often been suggested that the ROC has always been subservient to the State 
and supportive of its autocracy and stays so. Contra VLADIMIR VALDENBERG, 
DREVNERUSSKIE UCHENIIA O PREDELAKH TSARSKOI VLASTI (1916) (persuasively refuting 
the thesis about the Church’s submissiveness). Whatever the Church’s teaching on civil 
disobedience might be, there are no compelling reasons to consider this “caesaropapism” 
as an immutable feature of Russian Orthodoxy. It was not without good grounds that one 
of the first commentators of the Social Doctrine found in paragraph III.5 a new approach to 
the doctrine of disobedience: “[T]his point of doctrine seems to be an important step to 
overcome an archaic Byzantine symphony of Church and state, by transferring to a more 
modern model of Church-state relations, founded on a contractual basis.” Benjamin Novik, 
Analysis of “The Fundamentals of Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church,” 22 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION E. EUR., no. 5, 2002, at 8. 
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based on mutual support and mutual responsibility without one 
side’s intruding into the exclusive domain of the other.”45 
Nonetheless, the way Chapter III of the Social Concept describes the 
domains of the Church’s competence implicitly broadcasts broader 
theocratic ambitions. By compiling a short list of exclusive state 
competences46 and outlining a longer list of joint competences of 
state and church,47 the Social Concept endows the Church with a 
broad domain of implied competences that has so far been 
unknown in the history of Byzantium or Russia. 
The Social Concept also provides a closed short list of state 
prerogatives where the Church is precluded from intervening: 
resistance to sin by force, use of temporal authoritative powers and 
assumption of governmental functions which presuppose 
coercion.48 Another version of this list a few paragraphs below also 
includes political struggle, civil war, and intelligence.49 This list is 
much shorter compared with the exclusive prerogatives of state 
powers in Byzantium where the Church was not allowed to 
intrude.50 This division of powers between the Church and the State 
is reminiscent of medieval Catholic conceptions such as the two 
swords doctrine. What is more important, there were no such closed 
lists in Byzantine law. It implicitly belonged to the emperor to 
determine the limits of possible intervention from the Church into 
“human affairs.” Also, the emperor could at any time lengthen this 
list at his discretion or prohibit any interference of the Church in 
any matters. 
A broader, more open list of the Church’s fields of cooperation 
with the State is provided elsewhere in the Social Concept, which 
embraces various spheres from social programs, national 
healthcare, culture, family, and education to international law, 
national legislation, crime control, and public morality51: all of these 
spheres in Byzantium were explicitly reserved for the state. It 
suffices to take a look at the contents of the Social Concept to see the 
scope of the ROC’s ambitions that by far exceed what the Byzantine 
 
 45. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.4. 
 46. Id. § III.3. 
 47. Id. § III.8. 
 48. Id. § III.3. 
 49. Id. § III.8. 
 50. Deno J. Geanakoplos, Church and State in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of 
the Problem of Caesaropapism, 34 CHURCH HISTORY 381, 388–92 (1965). 
 51. SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § III.8. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:5 (2021) 
1198 
or medieval Russian Church could claim based on the theory of 
Symphonia. The Social Concept approvingly cites the 1917–18 
Declaration of the ROC Local Council, which mandated that  
decrees and statutes issued the Orthodox Church for herself in the 
order established by herself, as well as deeds of the church 
government and court shall be recognized by the State as legally 
valid and important unless they violate state laws . . . State laws 
concerning the Orthodox Church shall be issued only with the 
consent of the church authorities.52 
However, it remains unclear whether the ROC claims in 
modern day that its decrees and statutes shall also become sources 
of Russian law. It is hardly conceivable in the foreseeable future 
that religious doctrines would obtain the force of law, like the 
decisions of ecumenical councils that were accepted as law in the 
Byzantine Empire pursuant to Novel 131 of Justinian, or that the 
Russian State would require the Church’s approval for some of its 
laws. Not only does the technical question of “sources of law” 
impede the implementation of Symphonia in Russian law, but so 
does the fundamental legal principle of rule of law.53 It might be 
that the ROC implies here not the power to regulate social life (to 
issue legal rules binding on every member of society) but rather the 
power to define (to provide interpretations to legal rules and 
thereby to control application of the law in matters that are relevant 
to the Church). Regardless, this kind of Symphonia implicates that 
the ROC believes that its dogma prevails over the law.54 
IV. RUSSIAN LAW AND IDEOLOGICAL RAPPROCHEMENT OF THE 
CHURCH AND THE STATE  
Until recently, this combination of the ideological authority of 
the Church and the political power of the State might have seemed 
a reasonable balance. Establishment of state or official ideology is 
prohibited by Article 13 of the Russian Constitution, but Russia 
badly needed an ideology in the early 2000s when Putin proclaimed 
 
 52. Id. § III.4. 
 53. See supra Part II. 
 54. In some situations, secular law can cede to religious ideology to protect the right 
of believers (e.g., conscientious objectors); in such situations, religious denominations can be 
said to have success in prioritizing their dogmas over general legal provisions. It is a matter 
of degree to decide whether the continued triumph of a religious denomination over official 
law constitutes a threat to the rule of law or not. 
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his program of rebuilding Russia as a great power, with allusions 
to the “great national past.”55 Almost immediately, already in 2000, 
the ROC’s Social Concept outlined ideological preferences and 
rhetoric for political authorities for years to come. 
In terms of this new Symphonia, the Russian State concedes 
ideological leadership to the ROC and implicitly accepts the 
secondary ideological role of “protector of the true belief,” a title 
ascribed to the Russian State since the late Middle Ages. This 
Symphonia implicitly requires the State to submit itself to the 
ideological authority of the Church in its capacity of “soul” (the 
guiding force of politeia, according to the Sixth Novel of Justinian).56 
As far as both the ROC and the Russian State follow similar 
conservative agendas of “traditional values,” there should be no 
important contradictions between them. In 2000, the Church found 
itself in a position to create a mutually beneficial relationship: the 
Church gets to assert its symbolic authority over the State and its 
law while at the same time demanding non-interference of the State 
into religious issues, and the State gets to profit from the Church’s 
ideological authority to reinforce state legitimacy, so that both are 
able to fight their common “liberal enemies.” 
The 2020 constitutional amendments57 have apparently been 
aimed at affirming this Symphonia. For example, the reference to 
“the belief in God as this belief was transferred to us from our 
ancestors” as the guarantee of Russia’s state integrity in Article 67.1 
implicitly means that the “vertical of power” (the top-down 
command structure established by Vladimir Putin during his 
 
 55. Already in his inaugural speech on May 7, 2000, Putin asserted, “There is no doubt 
that we can draw strength from our past . . . [and will] feel pride in these pages that we are 
writing in the history of our great nation.” Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Inaugural 
Address (May 7, 2004), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48210. 
 56. THE CIVIL LAW: INCLUDING THE TWELVE TABLES, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE 
RULES OF ULPIAN & THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS (S.P. Scott trans., 1932), 
https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/N6_Scott.htm. 
 57. Federal’nyĭ Zakon RF o Popravke k Konstitut͡sii Rossiĭskoĭ Federat͡siĭ [Federal Law 
of the Russian Federation on Amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation] 
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII, [SZ RF] [Russian Federation 
Collection of Legislation] 2020, No. 1. The official Russian version is available at 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202003140001. 
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presidency)58 in Russia is legitimized by the Orthodoxy.59 Along 
with mentioning God (as proposed by Patriarch Kirill),60 the 2020 
amendments introduced into the Constitution a number of other 
conservative ideas that reflect dogma: historical roots of religious 
beliefs, heterosexual family, traditional values, etc.61 The 
practicality of these amendments is clear—they help to keep 
political authorities and courts immune to the ubiquitous 
reproaches of sham constitutionalism, meaning to act contrary  
to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.62 At the same time, these 
amendments indirectly reaffirm the ideological authority of  
the Church that managed to insert its doctrinal provisions into  
the Constitution. 
As shown above, the ROC profited from the ideological 
vacuum and weakness of the Russian State in the early 1990s, 
having acquired a good deal of political influence. But short-term 
political expediency was and remains questionable in terms of the 
rule of law. The dilemma for the ROC was that by accepting secular 
human rights and liberal principles, the Church would risk losing 
its ideological power or, at least, would not increase it. On the other 
side, by rejecting these values, the Church would risk entering a 
conflict with the State which is formally bound by human rights63—
the Russian Constitution considers them as fundamentals of its 
constitutional order.64 De facto, the State has the prerogative to  
put constitutional principles aside when pursuing its geopolitical 
and other objectives. But it is hardly believable that the State is 
prepared to tolerate the Church’s claims to the same sovereign 
 
 58. See ANDREW MONAGHAN, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE RUSSIAN VERTIKAL: THE 
TANDEM, POWER AND THE ELECTIONS (2011). 
 59. Mikhail Antonov, God and “the Belief of Ancestors” in the Russian 
Constitution, INT’L CTR. FOR L.  & RELIGION STUD. (Oct. 31, 2020), 
https://talkabout.iclrs.org/2020/10/31/god-and-the-belief-of-ancestors-in-the- 
russian-constitution/. 
 60. Elizaveta Koroleva, Popravki v Konstitut͡sii͡u: t͡serkovʹ prosit ne zabytʹ o boge, 
GAZETA.RU (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2020/02/01/12939446.shtml?updated. 
 61. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION]  
arts. 67, 68, 72 (Russ.). 
 62. See generally Andrey Medushevskiy, Russian Constitutional Development: Formal and 
Informal Practices, 6 BRICS L.J. 100 (2019). 
 63. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 17 (Russ.). 
 64. Id. ch. 2. 
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power to exclude itself from constitutional order.65 After all, it is  
not out of the question that post-Putin Russia might reaffirm  
its fidelity to the letter and spirit of the 1993 Constitution and its 
liberal interpretation. 
Putting this situation in Schmittean terms, if the Church acts as 
a direct enemy of human rights (in their liberal meaning enshrined 
in the Constitution), it formally can become the enemy of the State. 
This does not mean that the Church will become the State’s enemy 
in reality for the foreseeable future. In many situations the Russian 
State does not really care about the Constitution,66 so the State can 
side with the Church on human rights despite the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, by rejecting human rights the Church would formally 
challenge the political order established by the State in the 
Constitution—the power which belongs only to the sovereign 
(including the power to act beyond the law and to introduce 
exceptions from the law). From this perspective, the ROC can fall 
into what Professor Stoeckl calls the “disestablishment model,”67 in 
which the Church would act like an antagonist of the State, engaged 
in moral or cultural opposition to it. The tension between the 
Church and the State would not concern human rights as such—for 
the ROC, attacking human rights would also imply challenging the 
State’s sovereign powers and its symbolic authority. 
To avoid this dangerous conundrum, the ROC attempted to 
“appropriate” human rights—in the sense of interpreting them in 
the way they are subordinated to religious morals. This attempt 
was reflected, among other sources, in the Teaching, which opens 
with the statement that “human rights protection is often used  
 
 65. The interpretation of Symphonia as empowering the Church to control the 
sovereign powers of the State can be found in the conception of Archbishop Serafim Sobolev 
(1881–1950). His book Russian Ideology (1939) presupposed a kind of checks and balances 
mechanism between church and state authorities, picturing the Church and the State as co-
protectors of the national sovereignty of Russia. In the recent years, this conception has 
grown in popularity among contemporary ROC’s thinkers and conservative ideologists. E.g., 
Tatiana L. Migunova & Luybava R. Romanovskaia, Simfonia vlastei kak printsip 
vzaimootnoshenii mezhdu cherkov’iu i gosudarstvom, 3 VESTNIK NIZHEGORODSKOGO 
UNIVERSITETA: GOSUDARSTOVO I PRAVO 147 (2013); Hieromonk Gennadius, Tserkovno-
politicheskie vzgliady sviatitelia Serafima (Soboleva), 1 VESTNIK ISTORICHESKOGO OBSHCHESTVA 
SANKT-PETERBURGSKOI DUKHOVNOI AKADEMII 29 (2018). In 2016, Archbishop Serafim was 
canonized by the ROC. 
 66. E.g., William E. Pomeranz, Russia’s Broken Constitution, WILSON CTR. (June 26, 
2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-broken-constitution. 
 67. Kristina Stoeckl, Three Models of Church-State Relations in Contemporary Russia,  
3 GOSUDARSTVO, RELIGIIA, TSERKOV’ V ROSSII I ZA RUBEZHOM 195–223 (2018). 
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as a plea to realize ideas which in essence radically disagree  
with Christian teaching.”68 It therefore belongs to the Church to 
delimit the extent to which human rights are coextensive  
with “faith and moral principles”69 and, implicitly, condemn—or, 
at least, bring into question—all other human rights. Symbolically, 
the Teaching does not mention the Russian Constitution and  
the ROC’s acceptance of its provisions. Instead, the Church relies 
on the concept of human dignity, trying to align human rights  
with religious morals sub specie aeternitatis or, in terms of  
legal philosophy, relying on a kind of suprastatutory natural 
(divine) law. 
In the post-Soviet period, relations between the ROC and the 
Russian State have been mutually profitable. As in previous 
centuries, the Church has supported the legitimacy of the State and 
assumed privileges and protection from it. In pre-1917 Russia, this 
Symphonia of the Church and the State was one of the cornerstones 
of the law, as reflected in the famous motto “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, 
Nationality.” Legality and legitimacy of the church-state tandem in 
Imperial Russia reinforced each other. There were no concerns 
about the Church’s conformity with prerevolutionary Russian law, 
albeit the Russian version of caesaropapism70 was harshly criticized 
by intellectuals from other perspectives.  
In 1917, the Church was separated from the Russian State and 
was banned from all fields of social and political life. The 1993 
Russian Constitution confirmed that the supreme values of the 
Russian State and society were not derived from the Holy 
Scriptures or from religious dogma and, according to the literal 
meaning of the Constitution, they were not subject to any control 
or approval of the Church, which is separate from the State.71 As 
part of those supreme values, human rights were proclaimed to lie 
at the foundation of Russian legal order.72 With this, the ROC’s 
claims to have a say in political matters and to define the extent of 
the admissibility of human rights are formally incompatible with 
 
 68. TEACHING, supra note 29, Introduction. 
 69. Id. § V.4. 
 70. Employing this term only to refer to the factual order of the relations between the 
State, the Church, and the Emperor in Byzantium, I follow the established historiographical 
tradition, 4 ARNOLD TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 320–408, 592–623 (1954), without 
approving it or rejecting other, dissenting theories. 
 71. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14 (Russ.). 
 72. Id. art. 18. 
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constitutional law. The ROC’s claim to act “symphonically” with 
the State concerning the binding force of human rights inevitably 
enters into conflict with what the rule of law in a democratic state 
shall be. (Formally, Russia is both a rule-of-law (Rechtsstaat) and a 
democratic state, according to its Constitution).73 Also, the 
legitimacy that the State draws from its symphonic tandem with 
the Church appears questionable, to say the least, from the 
perspective of legality. 
Conceptualization of this new state of affairs requires from the 
ROC a good deal of creativity, as in its intellectual tradition the 
Church does not have conceptions that are suited to this 
constitutional framework—both in Byzantium and in pre-1917 
Russia, the alliance of church and state was approved by state law. 
Priority of the Constitution and federal laws over all other social 
norms in Russian society translates to, among other things, the 
secular principle according to which citizens are bound by the legal 
norms and principles created by the State, irrespective of their 
conformity with the Holy Scriptures, religion, or ethical doctrines.74 
Within this constitutional context, the Church may not make any 
judgments on the validity of constitutional and statutory law, 
human rights inclusive,75 and the State does not need religious 
justification for imposing these norms and principles upon citizens, 
or for being bound by human rights in its activities.76 Along with 
the separation principle, influencing lawmaking and law-
application through imposing religious ideologies plainly 
contradicts Article 14, which bans obligatory ideologies.77 
However, multiple observers argue that these formal 
requirements from the 1993 Constitution are not fully implemented 
in reality.78 These statements seem to be confirmed by the top 
 
 73. Id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 4, para. 2. 
 74. Id. art. 4, para 2. 
 75. Id. art. 15. 
 76. Id. art. 18. 
 77. Id. art. 14. 
 78. E.g., Marina Shishova, Spiritual and Political Dimensions in the Conception of the 
Russian Orthodox Church Concerning Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights, in ORTHODOX 
CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 351–64 (Evert Van der Zweerde & Alfons Brüning eds., 
2012); John Anderson, Religion, State and ‘Sovereign Democracy’ in Putin’s Russia, 2 J. RELIGIOUS 
& POL. PRAC. 249–66 (2016); Alexander Agadjanian, Tradition, Morality and Community: 
Elaborating Orthodox Identity in Putin’s Russia, 45 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 39–60 (2017). 
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hierarchs of the Church.79 Not infrequently, the Church incites 
political leaders and legal actors to disrespect the rule of law.80 As 
has been demonstrated above, the Church criticizes human rights 
or, at least, prefers to interpret them far from the original meaning 
of the Constitution, which was drafted according to the patterns of 
“liberal individualism” and without the Church’s participation.81 
This strategy of the ROC does not remain without effect in 
lawmaking and in law-application. The ideas voiced in the Social 
Doctrine, the Teaching, and other policy documents of the ROC are 
regularly repeated by politicians, judges of higher courts, and other 
legal actors—not only in their publications or public speeches, but 
also in their decisions.82 
V. THE RULE OF LAW AND RELIGIOUS ETHICS 
There are many gateways through which the Church can 
influence the interpretation of legal rules and principles. Human 
dignity is one of these ways. As could be expected, the definition 
and interpretation of dignity falls into the sphere of the Church’s 
ideological competences as far as “human dignity” is presumed to 
reflect God’s image in man.83 
From the very beginning, the Teaching makes clear that “[t]he 
human rights theory is based on human dignity as its fundamental 
notion. This is the reason why the need arises to set forth the 
Church’s view of human dignity.”84 Dignity is derived from the fact 
that man is created according to the image of God,85 and is 
 
 79. PATRIARCH KIRILL, SVOBODA I OTVETSTVENNOST’: V POISKAKH GARMONII. PRAVA 
CHELOVEKA I DOSTOINSTVO LICHNOSTI (2016). 
 80. Sergei Firsov, Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo pri Sviateishem Patriarkhe Kirille (Gundiaeve): 
osnovnye tendentsii razvitiia, 3 VESTNIK RUSSKOI KHRISTIANSKOI GUMANITARNOI AKADEMII  
351–60 (2013). 
 81. E.g., Mikhail Antonov, The Russian Constitutional Court as a Mediating Link Between 
Russian and European Law?, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 547–66 (Philip Czech 
et al. eds., 2019). 
 82. See, e.g., John Anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric 
Symphonia?, 61 J. INT’L AFFS. 185 (2007). 
 83. Although the Western concept of human dignity stems from Christian 
anthropology and is largely informed by it, secular definitions are also possible. Among 
others, such is the Kantian conception of dignity which prohibits each and every 
instrumentalization of human beings and requires treating everybody as a subject and 
nobody as an object. However, this prohibition is too general and, in practice, quite often is 
enriched by the “positive content” which originates from religious intellectual traditions. 
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described as God’s gift to human beings. The preliminary 
conclusion from this argument is that human beings are 
responsible for the direction and way of their lives86—this moral 
responsibility lies in the foundation of law.87 
Dignity is defined by the Church as a moral category par 
excellence. This implies the supremacy of religious ethics over other 
normative social orders, including legal order: “in the cases where 
the human law completely rejects the absolute divine norm, 
replacing it by an opposite one, it ceases to be law and becomes 
lawlessness, in whatever legal garments it may dress itself.”88 At 
the same time, ethical obligations shall precede any rights human 
beings may enjoy in social life. It follows that human rights are 
valid insofar as they are compatible with human dignity and their 
binding force is dependent on their congruity with religious ethics: 
“According to the Orthodox tradition, a human being preserves his 
God-given dignity and grows in it only if he lives in accordance 
with moral norms because these norms express the primordial and 
therefore authentic human nature not darkened by sin.”89  
This conclusion allows one to argue that “human rights cannot 
be superior to the values of the spiritual world”  and therefore can 
be restricted to fit religious morals.90 The Teaching provides a list of 
restrictions on the use of concrete human rights freedoms.91 The 
conclusion of Section III of the Teaching is telling:  
To make it possible the implementation of human rights should 
not come into conflict with God-established moral norms and 
traditional morality based on them. One’s human rights cannot be 
set against the values and interests of one’s homeland, community 
and family. The exercise of human rights should not be used to 
justify any encroachment on religious holy symbols things, 
cultural values and the identity of a nation.92  
One cannot help but notice that the development of case law of 
the Russian Constitutional Court until the 2020 constitutional 
amendments confirms, in various formulations, these principles: 
 
  86. See id. 
  87. See SOCIAL CONCEPT, supra note 18, § IV.2. 
  88. Id. § IV.3 (emphasis omitted). 
  89. TEACHING, supra note 29, § I (emphasis omitted). 
 90. Id. § III.2. 
  91. See id. § IV. 
 92. Id. § III (emphasis omitted). 
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human rights shall be protected if they do not encroach national 
identity, sovereignty, and traditional values.93 
Claiming the power to define and delimit human rights 
according to religious ethics, the Church indirectly challenges the 
constitutional order of Russia and reveals its political ambitions. 
Although not clearly articulated until now, these ambitions imply 
that the ROC reserves for itself the power to “teach” the State and 
the entire Russian society about the “correct religious ethics” and 
to obligate the State to “balance” human rights with this ethical 
doctrine. In terms of the body politics that underpins the Social 
Concept, the Church as “moral entrepreneur” guarantees the inner 
peace of the social body, while the State is expected to provide its 
force and coercion to implement this guarantee. 
Following these philosophical conclusions, high Orthodox 
hierarchs often condemn protecting the rights of minorities as 
apology of all-permissiveness. Thus, in 2017, Patriarch Kirill 
stressed that “freedom cannot be confused with all-permissiveness 
and the concept of human rights and freedoms should be 
complemented with the ideas of moral responsibility.”94 From this 
point of view, putting religious morals below human rights  
is wrong: “The liberal treatment of human rights and freedoms 
presupposes the absolutization of the sovereignty of the  
individual and his rights outside the moral context.”95 Here, one 
can notice how the Church tries to bridge its narrative to the 
contemporary conservative “political theology” based on the 
concept of sovereignty. 
The problem that the Patriarch failed to mention but seemingly 
had in mind is that human rights are derived from and intrinsically 
connected with the “secular liberal understanding” he has decried. 
To find a way to criticize human rights, he preferred to rely on the 
 
 93. See, e.g., Alekseyev v. Russia, App. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 & 14599/09 (Oct. 21, 
2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-101257 (discussing bans on gay parades in 
Russia); Bayev v. Russia, App. Nos. 67667/09, 44092/12 & 56717/12 (June 20, 2017), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-174422 (discussing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender activists); Markin v Russia, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 77 (2012) (discussing paying 
maternity leave to a military man). For the interplay between the protection of human rights 
and the argument of sovereignty in Russian law, see Mikhail Antonov, Sovereignty and 
Russian Resistance to Human Rights, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 529 (Philip 
Czech et al. eds., 2020). 
 94. Patriarch Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Opening Remarks  
at the Presidium of the Interreligious Council in Russia (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://mospat.ru/en/2017/10/24/news151731/. 
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concept of dignity. Rejecting “such social sinful things as abortion, 
homosexuality or euthanasia,” which are pleaded under the banner 
of human rights, the Patriarch Kirill is confident that “[w]ithout the 
religious roots the idea of dignity comes to hang in the air. . . . If we 
tear away the religious foundation, if we tear man away from God, 
then human dignity loses its justification as well.”96 If not directly, 
in this and in other allocutions the Patriarch and other hierarchs of 
the Church deny the priority of human rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, make them dependent on religious ethics, and thereby 
bring their views and the entire ROC political doctrine into 
dangerous opposition with the principle of rule of law. 
In the post-Soviet era, there have been almost no serious 
conflicts between the Russian State and the ROC. This is easily 
explained by the fact that so far both have pursued similar 
conservative agendas, each taking advantage of its part in the 
“Symphonia of powers.” But the Church’s hierarchs should consider 
that this symphonic cooperation is not guaranteed going forward. 
In Putin’s Russia any future movement toward liberalization can 
appear as an unsustainable pipe dream. But can one contend that 
there is absolutely no chance that this illiberal agenda will be 
discontinued in post-Putin Russia in favor of liberal ideology? This 
ideology has one important advantage—even after the 2020 
amendments, it coincides with the letter of the Constitution and 
thereby has a strong legitimizing effect. The change of ideologies is 
a normal process in the political development of states, but in 
contrast, for churches the change of their ideological landmarks  
is usually a long and difficult mission, if even possible in the  
first place. After all, one cannot exclude that hostility toward  
religious, ethical, and other pluralism can eventually prompt  
the ROC to oppose more actively the principle of rule of law  
in Russia, if political “winds” sometimes start blowing in a more 
liberal direction. 
CONCLUSION 
Dwelling on further developments of church-state relations in 
Russia, John Burgess admitted “the possibility that Russia could 
someday restore an Orthodox monarchy and hence a Church-state 
 
 96. Id. 
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symphonia.”97 But this can happen only if the Russian State 
becomes weak and falls under the tutelage of the Church, and this 
latter’s strategy would be to weaken the state. This strategy would 
be anything but politically safe for the ROC. The ROC is unable, 
under present circumstances, to impose its will on the autocratic 
Russian State and is likely to understand that such attempts would 
be destructive for the Church itself. In its tandem with the Russian 
State the ROC is still a minor, a weaker partner of the State, 
dependent on its will. Both historically and presently the Church 
does not control the State and its law, although sometimes it 
influences both. Still, the power of ideals is often irrational and can 
prompt irrational action even if there are no real chances of success. 
It is especially true in the sphere of religious belief which, in the 
words of the Gospel, is able to move mountains. Therefore, one 
needs to take seriously the ambitions of the ROC exposed in the 
Social Concept, the Teaching, and its other policy documents. 
Challenging the foundations of Russia’s constitutional order 
through defiance of the liberal conception of the rule of law (the 
ethical pluralism which entails “all-permissiveness” for minorities) 
has become a routine topic of the ROC,98 despite the fact that 
realistically the Church has neither reasons nor forces to undermine 
this order. The Church also prefers to ignore the fact that the 
Russian Constitution’s literal meaning is incompatible with 
conservative religious morals. At the same time, it relies on the 
Constitution and on human rights to vindicate its own interests. 
Recent developments due to COVID-19 in Russia have exposed 
this inconsistency. In the spring of 2020, one could observe how the 
Church decried the unconstitutionality of certain antivirus 
restrictions, asserting its constitutional rights against the State. The 
theocratic formulations of the Social Concept prompted sundry 
clericals, who took the idea of Symphonia literally, to challenge state 
commands and to insist the Patriarchate resist the State’s 
interferences more actively. With this, the Symphonia of church-
state relations in Russia in the spring and summer of 2020 seemed 
to start transforming into cacophony. Disastrous for the Church’s 
economic interests and political ambitions, this is also a serious 
challenge for the State, which now must reevaluate its control over 
 
 97. JOHN P. BURGESS, HOLY RUS’: THE REBIRTH OF ORTHODOXY IN THE NEW RUSSIA 
32 (2017). 
 98. See generally Hanna Staehle, Seeking New Language: Patriarch Kirill’s Media 
Strategy, 46 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 384 (2018). 
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the Church. Such a development is not unfamiliar—Russian history 
has already seen similar patterns in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Given the ideological ambitions of Russian political 
leadership, one cannot exclude the possibility or probability that 
the ROC will eventually become first chair in the caesaropapist 
orchestra conducted by the Russian State pursuant to the literal 
meaning of Symphonia as it was composed in Byzantine history 
more than a millennium ago. 
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